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1. SUMMARY: A California statute prohibits discrimi-
nation against women. The lower court construed this statute to 
prevent appellant from restricting its membership to males only. 
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The question presented is whether this statute impermissibly in-
- ------· -
fringes on the the 1st amendment right of association . 
..... -----------.......-------- - -------------
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Rotary clubs are non-
profit organizations composed of business and professional men. 
Their purpose is to "provide humanitarian service, encourage high 
ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and 
peace throughout the world." Petn Appx at C-5. Appellee is a 
21-member Rotary club located in Duarte, California. Each local 
club is a member of appellant Rotary International ("Internation-
al"), the organization that promotes and supervises the various 
clubs. Individual members belong to the local club, not to In-
ternational. At the time of this action there were over 19,000 
clubs, with a combined membership of over 900,000 men. 
In 1977, the Duarte club admitted 3 women as members, in 
direct contravention of the constitution and bylaws established 
by International. After notice and a hearing, International re-
voked Duarte's charter and terminated its membership in Interna-
tional. Duarte and 2 of the women sued, claiming, inter alia, 
that International had violated the California public accommoda-
tions statute, better known as the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
("Unruh"). That statute provides that people of either sex "are 
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 
every kind whatsoever." See Appx at A-4. The complaint asked 
that International be enjoined from enforcing its rules that re-
strict membership in local clubs to men, and that Duarte be rein-
'- stated as a member club. 
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The tc denied the requests for relief, finding that In-
ternational and Duarte are not "business establishments" within 
the meaning of Unruh because they did not provide goods or serv-
ices to its members. The· tc also found that unless International 
was allowed to enforce its male-only membership rule, the associ-
- . --··-·---
ational rights of many individual Rotarians would be violated. 
--···-·· -·~- ---------·---- .. 
On the other hand, the tc concluded that the enforcement of the 
membership policy would not damage Duarte, the individual plain-,.. 
tiffs, or women in general. 
The Cal. Ct. of App. reversed. The court first held 
(/ . bl' h that the both Duarte and International were bus1ness est.a 1s -
v\ 
ments, and therefore were prohibited from discriminating against 
women in its membership policies. The court found that Interna-
tional had sufficient "business attributes" to come with in the 
terms of the statute, and that "business concerns are a motivat-
ing factor in joining local clubs." Id., at C-26. The court 
rejected the argument that the clubs did not provide goods and 
services to their members, noting that Rotarians receive an orga- ;7 
. 
nizational magazine and other publications, plus are allowed to 
attend Rotary business conferences, where they learn management 
techniques and other professional skills. 
Second, the court ruled that admitting women to the 
local clubs would not cause irreparable harm to International or 
to individual ~otarians. The court acknowledge~ that the member-
~ 
ship policy had widespread support within the organization, and 
that the efficient operation of the clubs depended on agreement 
~ and cooperation. But there was little evidence, said the court, 
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that the admission of women would interfere significantly with 
Duarte's or International's goals. 
Finally, the state court rejected the claim that the 
forced admission of women would violate the constitutional right 
of free association. The court relied heavily on Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 u.s. 609 (1984), which held that a 
Minnesota anti-discrimination statute did not violate the 1st 
amendment by forcing the Jaycees to admit women. In Roberts this 
Court found that the right of intimate association applied with 
particular force to certain types of organizations: those that 
are small, that share a common purpose and policy, that are se-
lective, and that are "seclu[ded] from others in critical aspects 
of the relationship." Id., at 620. This Court found, however, 
that the Jaycees were not entitled to 1st amendment protections 
against state discrimination laws, because that organization did 
not demonstrate the necessary degree of intimate affiliation 
among its members. The Court noted that membership in the local 
Jaycee chapters was both large and non-selective, and that numer-
ous non-members of both sexes often participated in the group's 
activities. Id., at 621. 
The Cal. App. Ct. found that the Rotary organization was 
similar enough to the Jaycees to compel the same result. The 
court conceded that membership in the local clubs was selective, 
and that fellowship was a shared goal of the members. But it 
concluded that several other factors demonstrated a lack of inti-
mate affiliation. First, "the immense size of International and 
the number of Rotarians throughout the world is hardly indicative 
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of an intimate relationship." Appx at C-35. Second, the court 
pointed out that despite the fraternal nature of the clubs, busi-
ness benefits and commercial advantages were strong inducements 
for most members to join. Third, the court noted that each local 
organization was required to allow member from any other chapter 
to attend its meetings, thus encouraging "worldwide" congenial-
ity. 
The appeals court therefore ordered that International 
be enjoined from enforcing its membership pol icy. The Cal. S. 
Ct. denied a petition for review. 
3. CONTENTIONS: International's first claim is that 
the Rotary organization is not like the Jaycees, and that accord-
ingly Roberts is distinguishable. As the lower court in that 
case found, the Jaycees had a non-selective membership policy 
that encouraged people to join in order to enhance their commer-
cial interests. Rotarians, however, have been discouraged from 
using their club membership for commercial gain, or from giving 
preferential business treatment to other members. The Jaycees 
encouraged women and other non-members from participating in its 
activities; Rotary clubs have well-defined policies restricting 
most of its activities to its members. 
In addition, membership in a Rotary chapter is highly 
selective. Members must be a business leader or other profes-
sional, and must be of good moral character. With a few excep-
tions, only 1 representative of each occupation is permitted per 
chapter. This means that although there are a large number of 
clubs, the average membership in each club is fewer than 50. The 
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men in these small groups are united by a common interest in com-
munity service and fellowship, thus demonstrating a shared, per-
sonal goal that the Court found significant in Roberts. The 
local clubs also are "secluded" from others, in that their meet-
ings are open to members only. All of these characteristics show 
that Rotary clubs should be given full constitutional protections 
for their right to associate with others, free from the state 
requirement that it accept people other than those chosen by the 
members. 
This case presents a critical issue that affects members 
of private organizations everywhere. The Court has the opportu-
nity to define the scope of Roberts, and to make it clear that 
the right of intimate association is not as narrow as the deci-
sion below suggests. The issue is presented by way of appeal 
rather than a petition for cert, because International has chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Unruh, and the state court re-
solved the challenge in favor of the statute's validity. See 28 
u.s.c. §1257 (2). 
International's second claim is that the lower court's 
interpretation of Unruh is both overbroad and unconstitutionally 
vague. While the statute seems clear on its face, the California 
courts have given Unruh such confusing and inconsistent interpre-
tations that it is impossible to know what actions are included 
within its reach. For example, it has been held not discrimina-
tory to exclude all but the elderly from certain types of hous-
ing, but has been found impermissible to exclude families with 
children from other rental facilities. See Juris. Stat. at 25. 
No. 86-421-ASX 7. 
The court in this case has drawn such an arbitrary line that In-
ternational could not have known in advance that its conduct was 
prohibited. 
Appellee: There is no reason for the Court to hear this 
case. First, this is not an appeal because International does 
not draw into question the validity of Unruh. The claim below 
was that International's 1st amendment rights prevented the court 
from applying the state statute in that particular situation. 
There was no allegation that Unruh itself is unconstitutional. 
The claim thus should be treated as a petition for certiorari. 
Cert is not warranted in this case, because the state 
court correctly found that the Rotary organization was enough 
like the Jaycees to be covered by Roberts. International is not 
a small, intimate organization, it is a worldwide network of 
nearly 20,000 clubs that consist of nearly one million members. 
The Jaycees, by contrast had only 7,400 chapters and 300,000 mem-
bers. Nor are the Rotary clubs "secluded" in any sense; most of 
the activities are done in public, and the organization goes to 
great lengths to publicize and promote its existence and its 
work. 
Like the Jaycees, Rotary Clubs attract members that seek 
business opportunities and commercial advantages. Most Rotarians 
have their dues paid by their company or employer, and this pay-
ment is tax-deductable as a business expense. Moreover, one of 
the benefits of membership is the right to at tend professional 
seminars to improve business skills. 
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Therefore, this case is virtually identical to Roberts, 
making that decision dispositive. The lower court correctly ap-
plied the law and reached a reasonable result. There is no sub-
stantial federal issue presented. 
4. DISCUSSION: There is an important threshold ques-
tion of whether this case should be treated as an appeal or as a 
petition for cert. Stern & Gressman offer the following guidance 
[I]t is necessary for appeal purposes that the litigant 
make specific and plain in the state court his conten-
tion that the application of the statute to his partic-
ular circumstance would make the statute void under 
federal law. If he chooses not to phrase his claim in 
that manner but argues instead that his federal rights 
prevent the application of the state statute to him, an 
adverse decision amounts to a denial of his assertion 
of federal rights rather than a validation of the state 
statute, and review can be had •.. only via certiorari. 
Supreme Court Practice at 113. 
Although I am somewhat unclear about the distinction 
being drawn, I think that the filings in this case are best char-
acterized as a cert petition. 
~
It does not appear from the opin-
ion below that International specifically challenged the consti-
tutional i ty of Unruh. In its brief before the Cal. App. Ct. , 
International argued that the "Injunctive Relief Sought Would 
Violate Rotary's ••. Freedom of Association." See Motion to Dis-
miss at 7. The decision below thus seems to rest on the "denial 
of [International's] assertion of federal rights," since the 
court held that International is not entitled to associational 
protections. The state court did not concluded that the statute 
was valid despite the existence of International's 1st amendment 
rights. Because of this, and because appellant did not make 
"specific and plain" his claim that Unruh was unconstitutional, I 
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tentatively recommend that the appeal be dismissed and the Court 
treat the jurisdictional statement as a petition for cert. 
No matter how the case is viewed, it presents an impor-
tant federal issue. Nevertheless, should the Court decide to 
~
consider the p&pers as a cert petition, I recommend denial. Rob-
erts was decided in July 1984, and the decision has not had time 
to develop in the lower courts. As yet there does not appear to 
be a conflict over the scope or meaning of Roberts among the 
highest state courts or among federal courts. This Court may 
prefer to wait until other decisions involving similar groups 
(e.g., Kiwanis and Lions Club, amici here) present the issues 
more fully. Moreover, based on the information presented, the 
decision below was not unreasonable. 
The claim that Unruh is vague and overbroad does not 
present a certworthy issue. First, it appears that the arguments 
are meritless. The treatment of Unruh in the California courts 
is not so irrational as to raise a constitutional issue. Second, 
this issue was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, it only 
arose in the petition for rehearing. At that point the state 
court was not obligated to consider the matter, and apparently 
did not do so. This Court similarly should refuse to hear the 
claim. 
If this is an appeal, however, I recommend that the 
Court postpone consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the 
merits. Although it appears doubtful that Rotary is different 
enough from the Jaycees to distinguish this case from Roberts, it 
would be difficult to summarily affirm based on the information 
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before the Court. International has alleged that its clubs are 
more selective and more intimate than the Jaycees, factors that 
the Court recognized as important in defining the rights of asso-
ciation. I would be uncomfortable making factual distinctions 
between the organizations on the basis of the papers filed. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that the appeal be 
dismissed, that the papers be treated as a cert petition, and 
that cert be denied. 
There is a response and 4 amicus briefs. 
October 22, 1986 Leipold Op. in appx. to juris. statement. 
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ROTARY GINA- POW 
86-421 Board of Directors of Rotary International 
v. Rotary Club of Duarte et al 
MEMO TO FILE: 
I have now read 
Superior Court (making 
the opinions of the 
detailed findings of 
California 
fact and 
ruling in favor of Rotary International), and the opinion 
of the California Court of Appeals reversing the Superior 
Court. 
The question as to which I particularly would like my 
clerk's view is whether we have juris diction over this 
appeal. We "postponed". The case is in rather a curious 
posture. The appellee, a local rotary club in Duarte, was 
having membership problems and invited women to join. 
This violated the by-laws of Rotary International, and 
the Duarte club's charter was revoked by Rotary 
International. The Duarte Club then brought this law suit 
on behalf of itself and three women. Its complaint, on 
its face, appear to rely on California law. The superior 
Court stated that the "heart of the dispute" arises under 
the Unruh Act, and that the issue under that Act "whether 
Rotary is a 'business establishment'". 
2. 
The basic position of appellants is that Rotary is a 
"private" type of club, and that its members have a 
constitutional "right of association" under the First 
Amendment. Appellees, and all of the "1 iberal amici 
briefs, insists that Rotary is essentially a "business 
establishment" under California law and in fact, and 
therefore this case is controlled by our decision in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 
But before we reach the merits, there is a question -
as noted above - whether we have appellant jurisdiction. 
It is not entirely easy to know exactly what issue was 
decided. The final paragraph in the Court of Appeals 
opinion is helpful in this respect: 
"The matter is remanded to the Trial Court 
with directions to enter a new and different 
judgment in favor of Rotary Club of Duarte 
mandating the Board of Directors of Rotary 
International • • • to reinstate Rotary Club of 
Duarte's charter thereby reinstating it as a 
member of Rotary International and 
permanently enjoining Rotary International 
from enforcing or attempting to enforce its male 
only membership restriction against Rotary Club 
of Duarte." 
Although the complaint does not appear to be grounded 
on the federal constitution, the opinions below cite 
federal constitutional cases. The briefs of the parties 
3. 
rely primarily on our constitutional decisions such as the 
Jaycee case, King & Spalding, Alabama v. NAACP, and Moose 
Lodge, (Douglas' dissent). 
* * * 
I would like a brief and summary-type memo from my 
clerk on both the jurisdiction and the merits issue. 
LFP, JR. 
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Just ice Powell March 20, 1987 
From: Bob 
No. 86-421, Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary 
Club of Duarte 
Appeal from Cal. Ct. App. (Woods, PJ, McClosky, Shimer, JJ.} 
To be argued Monday, March 30, 1987 (4th case} 
Questions Presented 
1. Does the First Amendment afford Rotary Clubs and their 
members a right to exclude women? 
2. 
2. Is the California Unruh. Civil Rights Act, that has been 
interpreted to require admission of women to Rotary Clubs, 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad? 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Rotary Clubs. In 1982 Rotary International comprised 
19,788 local Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 907,750. (There are now more than 21,000 
clubs.) Rotary International seeks to organize a Rotary Club in 
every community, and to include in each club a representative 
from each profession, business, and institution in the community. 
An 11 average" Rotary Club had 46 members in 1982, although some 
have fewer than 20 members and a few have more than 900. An 
individual member belongs only to a local club. In turn, every 
local club is a member of Rotary International. 
Under the standard Rotary Club Constitution and Manual of 
Procedure, membership is limited to men. Under the Rotary 
"classification system, '1 members must be actively engaged in a 
"leadership capacity .. in a business, profession, or craft. The 
basic rule is that only one representative of a given profession, 
business or craft may be admitted to membership in a local club. 
But ••professions" may be divided and subdivided (e.g., a single 
club may admit a criminal lawyer, a probate lawyer, a tax lawyer, 
etc.). Moreover, there is no limit to the number of clergymen 
and journalists that may be admitted. Meetings are not open to 
the general public, but the clubs publicize their activities by 
3. 
hanging signs on the roadside, inviting guests to meetings, and 
seeking to have meetings reported in newspapers. 
Rotary International recommends a procedure for admitting 
new members, but the local clubs are not obliged to follow it. 
Under the recommended procedure, a candidate's name is proposed 
by the membership committee or an individual member. A 
classification committee determines whether the candidate's work 
fits an open (i.e. , unrepresented) class if ica tion, while the 
membership committee evaluates the candidate's character, 
business and social standing, and "general eligibility. u If any 
member objects to admitting a candidate, the admission decision 
is made by a vote of the club's board of directors. Membership 
in a Rotary Club is personal, and cannot be transferred from one 
club to another. But members of any local club are entitled to 
guest privileges at any other local club. Moreover, many members 
deduct their club dues as business expenses. 
Local clubs meet once a week to engage in fellowship and to 
plan community service projects. In the early days of the Rotary 
Clubs, members were encouraged to derive business advantages from 
the clubs. But the trial court found that Rotary long ago 
abandoned this approach: '4 For many years the official and 
genuine policy of Rotary International has been to discourage the 
seeking or giving of preferential business custom among Rotarians 
or the use of Rotarian membership for commercial gain. '1 J. s. 
App. B-3. 
Rotary asserts that its men-only policy is valuable because 
of the "quality of fellowship and camaraderie" in the local 
4. 
clubs, and because it permits Rotary International Hto operate 
effectively over a worldwide base of varied cultures and social 
mores.H Blue brf. 10. Proposals to admit women were defeated in 
1972, 1977, and 1980. {In 1980, the proposal received 40 percent 
of the vote.) women are allowed to attend meetings, and may join 
Interact or Rotaract, both sponsored by Rotary International. 
Rotary International encourages local clubs to form women•s 
auxiliaries, and authorizes the members of these groups to wear 
the Rotary lapel pin. 
B. This case. In 1977 the Duarte Rotary Club admitted 3 
women members because it was having trouble recruiting men with 
standing in the community. As a result, Rotary International 
revoked the Duarte Club•s membership in the International. The 
Duarte Club and the 3 women sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief in the California courts. They alleged that Rotary 
International had violated California•s Unruh Civil Rights Act of 
1959, which provides in part: 
uAll persons within the jurisdiction of this state 
are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, 
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are 
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.u Cal. 
Civ. Code §51. 
The trial court denied relief. It held that neither Rotary 
International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment u 
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The Cal. Ct. App. held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Club are business 
associations, because Rotary International has ''significant 
\ 
5. 
business-! ike attributes," and because the Duarte Club provides 
significant business advantages for its members. 
II. DISCUSSION 
This case is a sequel to Roberts v. United states Jaycees, 
46i u.s. 609 (1984), which upheld against constitutional 
challenge a Minnesota public accommodations law that was 
interpreted to require the Jaycees to admit women. Rotary clubs 
are somewhat more selective than the Jaycees. The issue is 
whether difference. 
A. Is this a Although the jurisdictional 
question is rather am inclined to think this is 
not a proper appeal un er 28 u. S.C. §1257 (2), which of course 
r= ,_ ,_., 
requires the appellant to have "drawn in question the validity of 
a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to 
the Constitution." 
....,..,., 
Stern and Gressman state the applicable 
principle as follows: 
"[I]t is necessary for appeal purposes that the 
litigant make specific and plain i~~tat~~~urt his 
contention that the aQQlication of tne~ to his 
particular circumstances would make the statute void 
under federal law. If he choo~es not~ his 
claim in that manner but arg~es instead th~t his 
federal ri hts revent a Plication of th state statute 
to him, an a verse dec1sio amounts to a den1al o his 
a~rtion of federal rights rather than a validation of 
the state statute, and review can be had in the Supreme 
Court only via certiorari 11 Stern, Gressman & 
Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 113 (6th ed. 1986). 
This principle has been affirmed in cases such as Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555, 562, n. 4 ( 1980); 
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 u.s. u.s. 84, 90, n. 4 
6. 
(1978): and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.s. 235, 244, and n. 4 
(1958). The distinction is perhaps open to question on the 
ground that it depends almost entirely on the way in which the 
appellant frames the issues. In any event, it is well 
established. 
In this case, Rotary International does not appear to have 
drawn in question the validity of the Unruh Act. The record 
excerpts aemonstrate this. 
First, the Cal. Ct. App. held that 11 application of the Unruh Act 
to International does not abridge its freedom of intimate or 
expressive association ... Blue brf. 4, quoting J.S. App. C-33. 
The closest Rotary International came to questioning the validity 
of the statute was in its petn to the Cal. Sup. Ct., which raised 
------= ----- -----the question: 'jDid the Court of Appeal's apg l i~ion of the 
Unruh Act abridge the First Amendment freedom of association 
privileges appurtenant to the membership policies of Rotary 
International and its local California club? .. Blue brf. 4. 
Rotary International relies mainly on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County 
of Los Angeles, 441 u.s. 434 (1979), which states that ~a state 
statute is sustained within the meaning of §1257(2) when a state 
court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against 
the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds. 'j Id., at 441. But/ , since Rotary International appears 
not to have made such a contention, Japan Line does it no good. 
If you agree with this analysis, you may wish to consider 
voting to deny certiorari. It may be better to let the lower 
courts decide more cases under the standards announced in Jaycees 
7. 
before the Court revisits the issue. Also, as discussed below, I 
conclude that the Cal. Ct. App. 's decision did not viol ate the 
First Amendment. 
B. Does the Unruh Act, as applied to Rotary Clubs, violate 
the First Amendment? 
distinguished between two 
freedom of association. 
Roberts v. United States 
types of constitutionally 




maintain certain intimate human relationships •• are 
constitutionally protected against intrusion by the State. 
Protecting these relationships usafeguards the ability 
independently to define one's identity that is central to any 
concept of 1 iberty. '' 468 u.s., at 619. Second, the Court has 
protected the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in 
expressive activitie~. I discuss these separately. 
1. Intimate association. Although the Court has not 
uprecisely identif [ ied] every consideration that may underlie 
this type of constituti6nal protection,u 468 u.s., at 618, prior 
decisions have concerned the creation and maintenance of 
associations among family members. E. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 u.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 u.s. 678 (1977) (childbirth); Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.s. 816 ( 1977 (raising 
and educating children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
u.s. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (living with relatives). At 
the other end of the spectrum, the Court recently held that there 
is no conastitutionally protected right of association in a 
8. 
commercial law partnership of 50 lawyers. Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 u.s. 69, 78 (1984). 
Roberts states that the constitutional protection afforded 
to intimate associations is not necessarily confined to 
associations among family members. The Court stated that a 
protected association is, among other things, 1'distinguished by 
such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of 
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, 
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship.~ 468 u.s., at 620. 
Roberts cites your concurring opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 u.s. 160, 187-189 (1976), for the proposition that 
u[d]etermining the limits of State authority over an individual's 
freedom to enter into a particular association ••• unavoidably 
entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's LFf 
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most 
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.~ 
Roberts, 468 u.s., at 420. The issue in Runyon was whether 42 
u.s.c. §1981 (the statute at issue in the St. Francis College 
case now under consideration) prohibits private commercial non-
sectarian schools from denying admission to students because they 
are black. You wrote separately to state your view that some 
contracts are so personal as to be outside the scope of §1981. 
You distinguished a private school that makes a public offer of 
admission to all children who meet minimum qualifications from ~a 
small kindergarten or music class, operated on the basis of 
personal invitations extended to a limited number of 
9. 
preidentified students " Id., at 188. The standard under 
§1981, in your view, is whether the contract is "part of a 
commercial relationship offered generally or widely, .. or whether 
the contract "reflect [s] the selectivity exercised by an 
individual entering into a personal relationship II Id., at 
189. Of course, the standard under §1981 may not be the same as 
the First Amendment standard, but it does offer helpful guidance. 
What follows is an attempt to compare the Jaycees and Rotary 
clubs on the basis of "objective indicia" of intimacy. 
,.. ---..---
a. Size. Local chapters of the Jaycees are "large. •• 468 
u.s., at 621. The Minneapolis and st. Paul chapters considered 
in Roberts had 430 and 400 members respectively. In contrast, 
the average Rotary Club has only 46 members. A few, however, 
have more than 900 members. Rotary clubs are supposed to have at 
least 20 members, but some have fewer. 
b. Selectivity. The Jaycees imposed no criteria for 
membership other than age and sex, and admitted new members 
without inquiring into their backgrounds. In ~ontrast, 
candidates for Rotary Club membership must be active in a 
leadership role in a~~~~s that is not already 
...----.-·-- ----- "' 
represented by another member. Moreover, the non-mandatory by-
--------·--------~ 
laws require that candidates be proposed for membership, be 
investigated by two committees (including a general background 
check), and be elected by vote of the board of directors if any 
member objects to their admission. 
c. Participation of women. Women affiliated with the 
Jaycees were permitted to attend various meetings, participate in 
10. 
selected projects and in social functions, including ~activities 
central to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another... 468 u.s., at 621. women are permitted to attend some 
Rotary club meetings and social functions, and apparently 
participate to a limited extent in some community service 
projects. In balance, it appears that Rotary clubs are less open 
to women than the Jaycees. 
d. Participation of non-members. Numerous non-members 
regularly participate in a substantial portion of the Jaycees 
activities. Again, the difference between Rotary and the Jaycees 
seems to be one of degree: Rotary club meetings are not 
generally open to the public, but non-members are permti ted to 
attend by invitation, and any member of another local Rotary club 
is entitled to attend. Joint meetings with other clubs are 
officially discouraged but not forbidden. 
I am inclned to think these differences, taken together, are 
~ - - --
not of constitutional dimension. Rotary Clubs do have -- --........___ •.. '-
significant contacts with non-members. Moreover, membership is 
based largely on standing in the community, particularly the 
business community. Although many Rotary Clubs do perform a 
general background check, my impression is that membership often 
is based more on 'jwhat you do~ than 11Who you are." This, of 
course, is precisely the type of organization that women who wish 
to advance in the business world would like to join. Even though 
Rotarians are instructed not to seek business advantages from 
their membership, the very fact that they know other community 
leaders on a personal basis may advance their careers. Moreover, 
11. 
membership may be a badge of accept~nce and status in the 
community that benefits the members business dealings with non-
members. (I am basing these very impressionistic and speculative 
remarks on a little knowledge of how the Rotary Club operates in 
Orange, Virginia. In that small community, member ship can be a 
significant benefit to a local businessman.) 
In sum, I think applying the Unruh Act to Rotary Clubs does 
not violate a constitutional right to intimate association. 
2. Expressive association. The Court has recognized 
a right to associate with others in order to engage in political, 
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural activities 
protected by the First Amendment. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 u.s. 886 (1982) ~ NAACP v. Button, 371 u.s. 415 
(1963). In Roberts, the Court considered whether admitting women 
would impede the Jaycees' ability to engage in protected 
activities, disseminate its views, or exclude persons with 
incompatible ideologies or philosophies. The Jaycees, at both 
the national and local levels, have take public positions "on a 
variety of diverse issues.~ 468 u.s., at 626. The Jaycees also 
engage in "a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, 
and other activities worthy of •• First Amendment protection. 
Id., at 626-627. The Court refused to accept "unsupported 
generalizations" that women have different views on various 
issues than men, and rejected as 11 attenuated at best" the 
contention that denying women the right to vote was itself 
protected symbolic speech. The Court further concluded that any 
actual abridgement of protected speech was necessary to further a 
12. 
compelling State interest preventing invidious discrimination in 
the distribution of public goods, services, and other advantages. 
In view of the Court's analysis in Roberts, Rotary's 
expressive association claim is quite weak. Rotary clubs are 
forbidden to take any position on political or religious issues. 
While their community service projects are entitled to First 
Amendment protection, there is no evidence that the admission of 
-----------------------~ 
women would hinder the Rotary clubs in carrying out these 
----- ---activites, or change their basic philosophy or ideology. Rotary ----- -~- .....____..._.. 
does suggest that admitting women in California would make Rotary 
less accepted in other countries with different attitudes towards 
women. Assuming this is true {the connection seems quite weak), 
it is necessary to prevent discrimination. ~ ~ r 
c. Is the Unruh Act unconstitutionally vague or overbroad? ~ 
Finally, Rotary contends that the Unruh Act is so vague that ~ 
persons ';of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its ~ 
meaning and differ as to its application.~ Connally v. General 
Construction Co., 269 u.s. 385, 391 { 1926). This issue was not 
raised until Rotary International filed its petition for reharing 
with the Court of Appeal. It was raised again in the petition 
for review to the Cal. Sup. Ct. Both petitions were denied 
without opinion. The Court obviously should not consider a 
constitutional challenge to the language of a state statute when 
the state court did not have an opportunity to construe the 
statute. 
In any event, the Unruh Act seems to be reasonably specific. 
The California courts have adopted tests {the 11 business-l ike 
13. 
attributes~ and business advantages~ tests applied in this case) 
that provide guidance to organizations in determining whether 
they are covered by the Act. Neither is the Act susceptible of 
11 Sweeping and improper application." NAACP v. Button, 371 u.s., 
at 433. It does not apply to private establishments, and the 
definition of private establishment seems within any boundaries 
imposed by the First Amendment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
One aspect of this case that troubles me is my inability to 
find a convincing distinction between the Rotary Club and clubs 
such as the Metropolitan, University, and Bohemian. All these 
clubs provide 11 fraternity.. as well as business connections and a 
"badge of success•~ that may advance their members' careers. (A 
member of the Metropolitan Club no doubt already is a success in 
the world, but membership can help him to maintain and build on 
his position.) If 11 small businessmen" can be required to open 
their societies to women, it seems that men's clubs for the rich 
and powerful can be required to do the same. In short, Rotary 
Clubs are sufficiently like very private and exclusive clubs that 
it will be difficult to draw a convincing constitutional 
distinction between them. 
I recommend that you vote to DISMISS the appeal and DENY -
certiorari. If you reach the merits, I recommend that you vote -to AFFIRM the judgment of the Cal. Ct. App. 
(1~ 
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March 31, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 86-421, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte 
We agree that the better ground of decision in this case (if 
the Court reaches the merits) is that local Rotary clubs are not 
constitutionally distinguishable from local Jaycees chapters. 
The Jaycees case also involved the national organization's effort 
to revoke the charter of a local chapter that voluntarily admit-
ted women; the Court decided that case by considering the charac-
teristics of the local clubs. 
It is true that the only immediate result of the Cal. ct.'s 
holding is that Rotary International may not expel the Duarte 
Club. Thus the Court might consider only whether Rotary Interna-
tiona!, an association of clubs, can claim First Amendment pro-
tection. (As we discussed, even if a small local club~ht is 
protected by the First Amendment, it is possible that a national 
association of local clubs is not protected, because the personal 
associations are much less intimate at a national level.) But it 
is clear from re-reading the Cal. ct's opinion that it~oth CaLc~ 
the local Rotary clubs and Rotary International subject to the 
Unruh Act. Thus the practical effect of the decision will be to 
require all Rotary clubs, at lea·st those in California, to admit 
women. To consider only the privacy rights of Rotary Interna-
tiona! would "duck" the main issue. 
page 2. 
I continue to think that this is not a proper appeal, and 
that the Court would be unwise to grant cert. so soon after Rob-
erts. 
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No. 86-421, Board of Directors of Rotary International,~ 
al. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, et al. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that 
requires California Rotary clubs to admit women members 




Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit 
corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in 
Evanston, Illinois. It is "an organization of business 
· and professional men united worldwide, who provide 
humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in 
all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the 
world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981); App. 35. 
Individual members belong to a local Rotary club rather 
than International. In turn, each local Rotary club is a 
member of International. Ibid. In August 1982, shortly 
before the trial in this case, International comprised 
19,788 Rotary clubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary 
club according to a "classification system." The purpose 
\ 
3. 
of this system is to ensure "that each Rotary club 
includes a representative of every worthy and recognized 
business, professional, or institutional activity in the 
· community." 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 7; App. 
86. Each active member must work in a leadership capacity 
in his business or profession. The general rule is that 
"[o]ne active member is admitted for each classification, 
but he, in turn, may propose an additional active member, 
who must be in the same business or professional 
classification."! Id., at 8; App. 86. Thus each 
classification may be represented by two active members. 
1Rotary clubs may establish separate classifications for 
subcategories of a business or profession, as long as the 
classification "deScribe[s] the member's principal and 
recognized professional activity " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 11 (1981); App. 87. For example, a 
single Rotary club may admit a criminal lawyer, a 
corporate lawyer, a probate lawyer, and so on. Ibid. 
4 . 
\ 
In addition, "senior active" and ''past service" members 
may represent the same classification as active members. 
See Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 (1981); 
· App. 38-39. There is no limit to the number of clergymen, 
journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. 
Subject to these basic requirements, each local Rotary 
club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for 
admitting new members. Id., at 7; App. 35. International 
has adopted recommended club by-laws providing that 
candidates for membership will be considered by both a 
"classifications committee" and a "membership committee." 
The classifications committee determines whether the 
candidate's business or profession is accurately described 
and fits an "open" classification. The membership 
5. 
committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business 
and social standing, and general eligibility." Brief for 
Appellant 7-8. If any member objects to the candidate's 
· admission, the final decision is made by the club's board 
of directors. 
Membership in Rotary clubs is open only to men. 
Standard Rotary Club Constituion, Art. V, Record 97. 
Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary 
International, testified that the exclusion of women 
results in an "aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by 
the present male membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-
52, and also allows Rotary to operate effectively in 
foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores. 
Although women are not admitted to membership, they are 
permitted to attend meetings, give speeches, and receive 
6. 
awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their 
own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary 
lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may 
· join Interact or Rotaract, organizations sponsored by 
Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California 
admitted Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary 
Freitag to active membership. International notified the 
Duarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to 
the Rotary constitution. After an internal hearing, 
International's board of directors revoked the charter of 
the Duarte Club and terminated its membership in Rotary 
International. -The Duarte Club's appeal to the 
International Convention was unsuccessful. 
7. 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County 
of Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that 
· appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 
Cal. Civ. Code §51. 2 Appellees sought to enjoin 
International from enforcing its restrictions against 
admitting women members, revoking the Duarte Club's 
charter, or compelling delivery of the charter to any 
representative of International. Appellees also sought a 
2The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this 
state are free and equal, and no matter what 
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or 
national origin are entitled to the full and 
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business 
establishments· of any kind whatsoever." Cal. 
Civ. Code §51. 
8 . 
declaration that the appellants' actions had violated the 
Unruh Act. After a bench trial, the court concluded that 
neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a 
· "business establishment" within the meaning of Unruh Act. 
The court recognized that "some individual Rotarians 
derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to 
warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax 
calculations, or to warrant payment of those expenses by 
their employers " App. to Juris. Statement B-3. But 
it found that "such business benefits are incidental to 
the principal purposes of the association ... to promote 
fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid. The 
court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis 
of these findings and conclusions, the court entered 
9 . 
judgment for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held 
that both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club 
· are business establishments within the meaning of the 
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a ''business" embraces 
"everything about which one can be employed," and an 
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, ... 
but also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or 
a 'permanent settled position (as in life or business).'" 
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 
795, 662 P.2d 427 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy 
Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-469, P.2d 
(1962)). The Court of Appeal identified several 
"businesslike attributes" of Rotary International, 
including its complex structure, large staff and budget, 
10. 
and extensive publi~hing activities. The court held that 
the trial court had erred in finding that the business 
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary club 
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by 
members of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business 
concerns are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," 
and that "business benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized 
upon by Rotarians and their businesses or employers." 
App. to Juris. Statement, at C-26. The Court of Appeal 
rejected the trial court's finding that the Duarte Club 
does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its 
members. In particular, the court noted that members 
receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other 
Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and display the 
Rotary emblem, and have the opportunity to attend 
11. 
conferences that teach managerial and professional 
techniques. The court also held that membership in Rotary 
International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a 
"continuous, personal, and social" relationship that 
"take[s) place more or less outside 'public view.'" 
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 
84, n.14, 707 P.2d 212, (1985) (quoting Horowitz, "The 
1959 California Equal Rights in 'Business Establishments' 
Statute--A Problem in Statutory Application," 33 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 260 , 281, 287, 289 (1960)). The court further 
concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would 
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary 
International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' 
argument that its policy of excluding women is protected 
by the First Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. 
12. 
United States Jayce~s, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). It observed 
that "[n]othing we have said prevents, or can prevent, 
International from adopting or attempting to enforce 
· membership rules or restrictions outside of this state." 
App. to Juris. statement C-38. The court ordered 
appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member of 
Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them from 
enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement 
against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' 
petition for review. We postponed consideration of our 
jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. u.s. 
3 
(1986). We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 
' 
~and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 




In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984), we upheld against First Amendment challenge a 
· Minnesota statute that required the Jaycees to admit women 
as full voting members. Roberts provides the framework 
for analysis of appellants' constitutional claims. As we 
observed in Roberts, our cases have afforded 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
judgment entered by the highest court of a State in which 
decision could be had "where is drawn in question the 
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of 
the United States, and the decision is in favor of its 
validity." 28 U.S.C. §1257(2). Appellants squarely 
challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as 
applied, and the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of 
the statute as applied. "We have held consistently that a 
state statute is sustained within the meaning of §1257(2) 
when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set 
of facts as against the contention that such application 
is invalid on federal grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441 (1979) (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 u.s. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren 
Trading Post v . . Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686, n.1 
(1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61, 
n.3 (1963); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 
u.s. 282, 288-290 (1921)). 
14. 
constitutional prot~ction to freedom of association in two 
distinct senses. First, the Court has held that the 
Constitution protects against unjustified government 
· interference with an individual's choice to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate or personal relationships. 
Second, the Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech 
or religious activities. In many cases, government 
interference with one form of protected association will 
also burden the other form of association. In Roberts we 
concluded that the nature and degree of constitutional 
protection are best determined by considering separately 
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' 
freedom of personal association and their freedom of 




The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter 
· into and carry on certain intimateo;:~ationships 
1\ 
is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill 
5u.-.e.A · -.-..a.-.tt ~~~Jo 
of Rights. !~~~ relationship~ may serve to tEansmit ~ 
J a :ta e e .. ~ ~ 
sAatad ieoals a~lie~, •Re tbaraby te~aster ~~ 
~~ 
di~rty. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
to mark the precise boundaries of this type of 
constitutional protection. The relationships to which we 
have accorded constitutional protection include marriage, 
Zablocki v. Radhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the 
begetting and bearing of children, Carey v. Population 
Services International, 431 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1977); 
16. 
child rearing and education, Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families, 431 u.s. 816, 844 (1977); and 
cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 
ot:~~~ 
· supra, at 503-504. ~have not held that constitutional 
.;\ 
protection is restricted to relationships among family 
members. On the contrary, we have said that the First 
Amendment protects those relationships, including family 
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal 
aspects of one's life." 468 u.s., at 619-620. In Roberts 
we observed that "[d]etermining the limits of state 
authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a 
particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful 
17. 
assessment of where that relationship's objective 
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most 
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 
· 468 U.S., at 618 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). In determining 
whether a particular association is sufficiently~ .... 
to warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors 
such as size, purpose, selectivity, congeniality, and 
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the 
relationship. !d., at 620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the 
relationship among Rotary club members is not the kind of 
vr~ 
intimate relation that warrants constitutional protection. 
~ 
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 
to more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 
18. 
(deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of 
Rotary International). There is no upper limit on the 
membership of Rotary clubs. About ten percent of the 
· membership of a typical club moves away or drops out 
during a typical year. 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club 
Service 19, App. 88. The clubs therefore are instructed 
to "keep a flow of prospects coming'' to make up for the 
attrition and gradually to enlarge the membership. Ibid. 
The purpose of Rotary "is to produce an inclusive, not 
exclusive, membership, making possible the recognition of 
all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be 
a true cross-section of the business and professional life 
of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on 
Rotary 67, App . . 84. The membership undertakes a variety 
of service projects designed to aid the community, to 
19. 
improve the standards of the members; businesses and 
professions, and to improve international relations. 4 
Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on 
· diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the 
members and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind 
of i~ personal relationship that 
protection under the First Amendment. 
we have accorded 
To be sure, 
membership in Rotary clubs is not open to the general 
public. But each club is instructed to include in its 
membership "all fully qualified prospective members 
located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary limits 
on the number of members in the club," and to "establish 
4Rotar clubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have 
provided ~ meals and transportation to the elderly, 
vocational guidance for high . school students, a swimming 
program for handicapped children, and international 
exchange programs, among many other service activities. 
20. 
and maintain a memb~rship growth pattern." Rotary 
International, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981); App. 61-62. 
Many of the Rotary clubs' central activities are carried 
· on in the presence of strangers. Rotary clubs are 
required to admit any member of any other Rotary Club to 
their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business 
associates and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary 
clubs, the visitors number "in the tens and twenties each 
week." App. to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary 
International). Joint meetings with the members of other 
organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. 
The clubs are encouraged to seek coverage of their 
meetings and activities in local newspapers. In sum, 
Rotary clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in 
21. 
an atmosphere of pr~vacy, seek to keep their "windows and 
doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69; 
App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the 
· Unruh Act to local Rotary clubs does not interfere unduly 
with the members' freedom of ifl~e association. 5 
B 
5Appellants assert that we " pproved" a di 
between the Jaycees and the Ki ani s Club in Ro e rts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630 (1984). Brief 
for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstruef oberts. ~ ~ 
In that case we observed tha the Minnesota co rt had 
suggested Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the 
State's public accommodations aw. We concluded t at this 
refuted the Jaycees' argument that the Minnesota statute 
was vague and overbroad. We h'eM~ ~cc~oA- t,o consider 
whether the relationship amen members of the Kiwanis Club I 
was sufficiently intimat~ to warrant constitutional 
protection. Similarly, we have no occasion in this cas;<1~ 
to consider whether the First Amendment protects the~igh ~ 
of individuals to associate in t~ ~b.l¥ s.e leg.t i ve " club 
that are found in aa~ . EH:ti e..s throughout the country. 
Whether the "zone of privacy" establish~c:l~ )Jy~ the First 
Amendment extends to a particular club or A requires a 
careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the 
particular relationshi p;!"at issue. 468 U.S., at 618. Cf. 
Moose Lodge No .. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) 
f 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
22. 
redress of grievances, and to worship would be of 
practical value if citizens could not associate with ea ~ 
· other for the purpose of carrying on those activities. 
~ 
~ Accordjngly,~e Court~ has recognized that the right to 
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment 
implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 u.s., at 622. See NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 
(1982). For this reason, "[i]mpediments to the exercise 
of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the 
right of association protected by the First Amendment 
" Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80, n. 2 
23. 
(POWELL, J., concur~ing) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958)). In this case, however, the evidence fails to 
~ 
· demonstrate that the admission of women will sigRificantly~ 
"\ 
k-. ~ ~.,.__j--~ ~ ~ 
affect ~~ exi~tin~ members' ability to carry out their .., 
o-~ 
~pressive activities. 
As a matter of policy, Rotary clubs do not take 
positions on "public questions," including political or 
international issues. Rotary International, Manual of 
Procedure 115 (1981), App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary 
clubs engage in a variety of commendable service 
activities that are protected by the First Amendment. But 
the Unruh Act does not require the clubs to abandon or 
alter any of these activities. It does not require them 
to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high 
24. 
ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and peace. 
~~J ~ 
I~ does  require them to abandon t~ classification 
~ ~ 
system or admit members who do not reflect a cross - section 
· of the community. Indeed, by opening membership to 
leading business and professional women in the community, 
~~k 
Rotary clubs ~ obtain a more representative cross-
1 
section of community leaders. 6 
/.9~ ~ ~pellants nevertheless assert that · admission of 
J ~~ "11 . . t ff t" women w1 1mpa1r Ro ary's e ec 1veness as an 
~ ·~~~J. ~· If ~ 
~~--o.lh.._t- international organization .'l Appellants' argument i"s 
k ..,....&.~ 1-L ~" -4 
u,fA-.t{lle -1-~ $'" 











meetings and participate in many of ~ activities. But 
6 In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of 
the managerial and professional labor force in the United 
States. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States 400 ( 1986). ~ LAc::~ •. • t9 .,.11-rC ~ 
EDJ 1 ,..,..(. ;.... 
~~ J e6a F~ "ttc.st_ 
~~~~,, 
~~~~~ w~ 
· ~A~, ~,.ye.._..~~~~ ~~l' 
~ t-~k /.o t.iv~~ ~. !5 ....... .,~~-- "(~ ~..~~-~-~' 
L ~ .J.c ~ lf.A. ~~4- ,. 
25. 
to the extent the Unruh Act may be viewed as infringing 
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that 
~ 
infringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling 
· interest in eliminating discrimination against women. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) 
(right of association may be limited b~ state regulations 
necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like 
the Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in 
Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the 
organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations 
laws "plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the 
highest order." 468 U.S., at 624. In Roberts we 
recognized that -the state's compelling interest in 
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition 
26. 
of leadership skill~ and business contacts as well as 
tangible goods and services. Id., at 626. We therefore 
hold that application of the Unruh Act to California 
· Rotary clubs does not violate the right of expressive 
£,4..-
assocation afforded bny the First Amendment. 
-'\ 
III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that 
these contentions were not properly presented to the state 
courts. It is well settled that this Court will not 
review a final judgment of a state court unless "the 
record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear 
implication that the federal claim was adequately 
presented in the state system." Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 
493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not present the 
27. 
issues squarely to the state courts until they filed their 
petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
· highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, 
it will be presumed that the omission was due to want of 
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the 
aggrieved party can affirmatively show the contrary."'" 
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181 n.3 (1983) 
(quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 471 U.S. 40, 50, n.11 (1974) 
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 u.s. 576, 582 (1969))). 
Appellants have made no such showing in this case. 7 
7 Appellants contends that they presented the vagueness 
and overbreadth issues in the following portion of their 
brief submitted to the Court of Appeal: 
"An even more serious potential for vagueness 
and overbreadth is that the Unruh Act (unlike 
the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited 
discrimination to race, color, creed, sex and 
other categories specifically noted in the 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that requires 
California Rotar:v. ~ubs to admit women members violates 
the First Amend~nt. 
I 
A 
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. 
It is "an organization of business and professional men united 
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage 
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good-
will and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rota-
r:v.~ub rather than to International. In turn, each local Ro-
~ tacy ~ub is a member of International. Ibid. In August 
1982;'shortly before the trial in this case, International com-
prised 19,788 Rotary~ubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 007,750. Brief for Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary ~lub 
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this 
.......... system is to ensure "that each Rotary ~ub includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recogn~ed business, profes-
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active 
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or 
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is 
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose 
an additional active member, who must be in the same busi-
ness or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus, 
each classification may be represented by two active mem-
bers. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" mem-
bers may represent the same classifications as active mem-
bers. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV, 
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of 
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 
(1981), A . 38-39. 
""" ubject to these~equirements, each local Rotary.£).ub 
is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admi"ifing 
1 
n.-c vv- v \ C\ c-. h , J l new members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has 
'""'-~ ad6pted recommende<l_~lub ::Ry-laws providing that candi-
dates for membership will be considered by both a "classifica-
tions committee" and a "membership committee." The 
classifications committee determines whether the candidate's 
business or profession is described accurately and fits an 
"open" classification. The membership committee evaluates 
the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and 
general eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any mem-
ber objects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is 
"'-.., made by the~ub's board of directors. 
""-.. Membership in Rotary4 ubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
"'-v 1 Rotary~ubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of 
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary 
" ..::slub may admit a eriminal la~r, a QOrporate lawyep;-a-probatEHawyery 
~.Ibid. 
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an 
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male 
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows 
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied 
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, 
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Ro-
tary members may form their own associations, and are au-
thorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women be-
tween 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract, 
organizations sponsored by Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted 
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to 
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club 
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary 
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's 
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club 
and terminated its membership in Rotary International. 
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention 
. was unsuccessful. · 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin In-
ternational from enforcing its restrictions against admitting 
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or 
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of 
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the 
2 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 
86-421-0PINION 
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a 
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary Interna-
tional nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" 
within the meaning Of) Unruh Act. The court recognized 
" that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business ad-
vantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian ex-
penses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of 
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits 
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . . 
to promote fellowship . . . and . . . 'service' activities." Ibid. 
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment 
for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are 
business establishments &Yitliin the me ami!~ the Unruh 
Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces "ev-
erything about which one can be employed," and an "estab-
lishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but also a 
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent 
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Vil-
lage Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427, 
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of 
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary 
International, including its complex structure, large staff and 
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held 
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business ad-
vantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary..c]ub are 
merely incidental. It stated that testimony by me"'ffibers of 
the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns are 
a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business 
benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and 
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C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's finding 
that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or fa-
cilities to its members. In particular, the court noted that 
members receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numer-
ous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and dis-
play the Rotary emblem, and <have the opportunitif9YaT.Itt--:-e--nd...,.._ _ T M o 'j \ 
conferences that teach managerial and professional tech- L--L--J 
-------=n=-iq:::-u=-=e::::--s~ The court also held that membership in Rotary In-
ternational or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "con-
tinuous, personal, and social relationship that take[s] place 
more or less outside public view." Id., at C-27 (internal 
. quotation marks and citations omitted). The court further 
concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would 
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary Interna-
tional. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that 
its policy of excluding women is protected by the First 
Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing 
we have said prevents, or can prevent, International from 
adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or re-
strictions outside of this state." App. to Juris. Statement 
C-38. The court ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte 
Club as a member of Rotary International, and permanently 
enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the 
gender requirement against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition 
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction 
to the hearing on the merits. -- U. S. -- (1986). We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
3 We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by 
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn 
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and 
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants 
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and 
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II 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld 
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that 
required the Jaycees to admit women as full votin member 
Roberts provides the framework for anal sis o a ellants' 
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases 
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that 
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or ersona relationships. Second, the 
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one 
form of protected association will also burden the other form 
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately 
' t.. }----=t=he;::...;e=.::.ffect of the challenged state action on individuals' free-
\ (l (, \) C- l e._.., --(.. i) 
\ l - dom of personal association and their freedom of expressive 
association. We follow the same course in this case. 
A 
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into 
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Such relationships may take various forms, including the 
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We 
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning 
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts 
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)). 
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to mark the precis oundaries of this type of constitutional 
protection. The relationships to which we have accorded 
constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and 
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and edu-
cation, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, supra, at 503-504. Of course (We have not held that 
constitutional protection is restricted to relationshi s amo 
family members. On t e rar , we have aid that the 
~ 
First Amendment protects those relationships, me u mg 
family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal as-
pects of one's life." oberts v. United States Ja cees 
supra, at 619-620. /.n Roberts we observed that "[d]eter-
mining the limits of state authority over an individual's free-
dom to enter into a particular association ... unavoidably en-
tails a careful assessment of where that relationship's 
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the 
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attach-
ments." 468 U. S., at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U. S. 160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In 
determining whether a particular association is sufficiently 
-'---- private to warrant constitutional protection, we consider fac-
tors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others 
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at 
620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship 
among Rotary 4 ub members is not the kind of intimate or 
personal elation that warrants constitutional protection. 
e s1ze of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to 
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
86-421-0PINION 
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~ tiona!). There is no upper limit on the membership of{ata-
0).,_--.....,r.y'T=-;;clr,;u~~. About ten percent of the membership of a typical 
cl~ moves away or drops out during a typical year. 2 Rota-
ry Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. The 
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects 
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge 
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to 
produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making 
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and en-
abling the club to be a true cross section of the business and 
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership un-
dertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the 
community, to raise the standards of the members' busi-
nesses and professions, and to improve international rela-
I D c~ \ J 
tions. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on di-
versity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the - p 1 ; -J <r~ G \ \ 
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind ofw~rso~al l..___ ___ __.J 
relationship to which we have accorded protection under the 
""- First Amendment. To be sure, membership in Rotary=:£_lubs 
is not open to the general public. But each club is inst:nfcted 
to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective 
members located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary 
limits on the number of members in the club," and to "estab-
lish and maintain a membership growth pattern." Rotary 
/\..\. \.____ !~ternational, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981), App. 61-62. 
"--'\\ ~any of the Rotary ~ubs' central activities are carried on in 
the presence of str~gers. Rotary ~lubs are required to 
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates 
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary ~ubs, the 
• otary ~lubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals 
and transp'<irtation to the elderly, vocational guidance for high school stu-
dents, a swimming program for handicapped children, and international ex-
change programs, among many other service activities. Record 
217H-217J. 
\rJ cv of GO 0 IS R...; l t C O!J V'l ~ 1-- Q..., +'VI crt \l-V t-o. r J (j t v b S 
\ ~ \.t.-~ S) VV'I : ' ()- ,- Ol'jo- VI\(., c-.+-~ o AS ~ C?~f o\ YV'\ 
vSe fv, \ VY' d \~ QDf'+oV\t Co~'fY",\)../\ ;~1 
~cx---.J 'c t.s , 
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visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App. 
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, 
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings 
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek 
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. 
In sum, Rotar~ubs, rather than carrying on their activities 
in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows and 
doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69, 
App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the 
Unruh Act to local Rotary~lubs does not interfere unduly 
with the members' freedom of private association. 5 
B 
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a cor-
responding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, . c; ll 
0 1 
<""" ., \ 
-.....,__ ~. ~~~cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468'-~
'at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-:-933 (1982). For this reason, 
5 Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jay-
cees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Rob-
erts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested 
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations 
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Min-
nesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether 
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently inti-
mate or private to warrant constitutional pro · n. Similarly, we hav 
no occasion in this case to consider~ the First Amendment protects 
the right of individuals to associat'ein-rl(e many clubs and other entities 
with selective membership that are found throughout the country. 
Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment ex-
tends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objec-
tive characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No . 107 v. lrvis, 
407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's 
associates can violate the right of association protected by 
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case, 
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting 
women to Rotary £!ubs will affect in any si nificant way the 
existing members'ability to carry out thei · "' · · · 
As a matter of policy, Rotary.$Jubs do not ta e pos1 wns on 
"public questions," including p~tical or international issues. 
Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), App. 
58-59. To be sure, Rota~ubs engage in a variety of com-
mendable service activities That are protected by the First 
Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the clubs 
to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not re-
quire them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian serv-
ice, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and 
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classifica-
tion system or admit members who do not reflect a cross-
section of the community. · Indeed, by opening membership 
to leading business and professional women in the commu-
nity, Rotary .:£J.ubs are likely to obtain · 
cross-section of community leader . 6 
'F6-t,he-extent the URFYH AGt way ae 'viewed as in:ftiH:gmg 
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that in-
fringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling inter-
est in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of 
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to 
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of 
• In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986) . 
. \) e, V\ 
OV" 
\Jc-r~o.JS 
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ideas). 7 On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota pub-
lic accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no 
distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. 
Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] com-
pelling state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at 
624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling 
interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the ac-
quisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as 
tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. The Unruh Act 
plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that applica-
tion of the Unruh Act to California Rotary_clubs does not vio-
late the right of expressive assocation afrorded by the First 
Amendment~ 
r III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these 
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. 
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented· in the state system." Webb v. 
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not 
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will 
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper pres-
entation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in 
this Court can affirmatively show the contrar ." "' Exxon 
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181 n. 3 (1983) (quoting 
7 Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec-
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by 
15 1;""'~-\-e. J +o 
+~t- S+-o-t t.... of 
(o- \ ;fonA~\ o--· 
the act that the 'udgment of the Califon;.~ C~o~u~rt:...!o~fl,A~p~p~ea~l~·~~~:::::_----,. 5 { 
· ou 1 · · . See supra, at@ . r Appellants' argument also l---J 
is undermined by the fact that women already attend the Rotary~ubs' 
meetings and participate in many of €9 activities. ~ 
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting 
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants 
have made no such showing in this case. 8 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
8 Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and over-
breadth issues in the fol owing portion of their brief submitted to the Court 
of Appeal: 
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the 
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited dis-
crimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted 
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among cus-
tomers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organiza-
tions like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the 
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad 
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.' 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in 
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in 
Brief for Appellants 36-37). 
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the 
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for 
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately 
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A ca-
sual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is 
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim 
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 
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No. 86-421 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNA-
TIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY CLUB 
OF DUARTE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[April-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that requires 
California Rotary clubs to admit women members violates 
the First Amendment. 
I 
A 
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. 
It is "an organization of business and professional men united 
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage 
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good-
will and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rota-
ry club rather than to International. In turn, each local Ro-
tary club is a member of International. Ibid. In August 
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International com-
prised 19,788 Rotary clubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary club 
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this 
system is to ensure "that each Rotary club includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary 
.. 
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active 
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or 
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is 
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose 
an additional active member, who must be in the same busi-
ness or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus, 
each classification may be represented by two active mem-
bers. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" mem-
bers may represent the same classifications as active mem-
bers. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV, 
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of 
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 
(1981), App. 38-39. 
Subject to these basic requirements, each local Rotary club 
is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting 
new members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has 
adopted recommended club by-laws providing that candi-
dates for membership will be considered by both a "classifica-
tions committee" and a "membership committee." The 
classifications committee determines whether the candidate's 
business or profession is described accurately and fits an 
"open" classification. The membership committee evaluates 
the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and 
general eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any mem-
ber objects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is 
made by the club's board of directors. 
Membership in Rotary clubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
' Rotary clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of 
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary 
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an 
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male 
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows 
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied 
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, 
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Ro-
tary members may form their own associations, and are au-
thorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women be-
tween 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract, 
organizations sponsored by Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted 
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to 
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club 
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary 
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's 
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club 
and terminated its membership in Rotary International. 
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention 
was unsuccessful. · 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin In-
ternational from enforcing its restrictions against admitting 
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or 
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of 
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the 
2 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a 
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary Interna-
tional nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" 
within the meaning of Unruh Act. The court recognized 
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business ad-
vantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian ex-
penses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of 
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits 
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . . 
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid. 
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment 
for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are 
business establishments within the meaning of the Unruh 
Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces "ev-
erything about which one can be employed," and an "estab-
lishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but also a 
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent 
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Vil-
lage Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427, 
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of 
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary 
International, including its complex structure, large staff and 
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held 
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business ad-
vantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary club are 
merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members of 
the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns are 
a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business 
benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and 
their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. Statement 
86-421-0PINION 
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C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's finding 
that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or fa-
cilities to its members. In particular, the court noted that 
members receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numer-
ous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and dis-
play the Rotary emblem, and have the opportunity to attend 
conferences that teach managerial and professional tech-
niques. The court also held that membership in Rotary In-
ternational or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "con-
tinuous, personal, and social relationship that take[s] place 
more or less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court further 
concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would 
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary Interna-
tional. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that 
its policy of excluding women is protected by the First 
Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing 
we have said prevents, or can prevent, International from 
adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or re-
strictions outside of this state." App. to Juris. Statement 
C-38. The court ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte 
Club as a member of Rotary International, and ·permanently 
enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the 
gender requirement against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition 
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction 
to the hearing on the merits. -- U. S. -- (1986). We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
3 We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by 
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn 
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and 
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C.§ 1257(2). Appellants 
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and 
./ 
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II 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld 
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that 
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members. 
Roberts provides the framework for analysis of appellants' 
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases 
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that 
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or personal relationships. Second, the 
Court has upheld the free. om of individuals to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one 
form of protected association will also burden the other form 
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately 
the effect of t~ challenged state action on individuals' free-
dom of personal association· and their freedom of expressive 
associatiOn. We follow the same course in this case. 
A 
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into 
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Such relationships may take various forms, including the 
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We 
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning 
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts 
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
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to mark the precise ndaries of this type of constitutional 
protection. The lationships to which we have accorded 
constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and 
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and edu-
cation, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, supra, at 503-504. Of course we have not held that 
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships amon ~ 
family member~\#e have at the 
First Amendment protects those relationships, including 
family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal as-
~ pects of one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, ./J ../-. · 
supra, at 619-620. t{ffiRoberts we observed that "[d]eter-- I~ 
mining the limits of state authority over an individual's free-
dom to enter into a particular association ... unavoidably en-
tails a careful assessment of where that relationship's 
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the 
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attach-
ments." 468 U. S., at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U. S. 160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In 
determining whether a particular association is sufficiently 
t Lprivate to warrant constitutional protection, we consider fac-
r t.ors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others 
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at 
620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship 
among Rotary club members is not the kind of intimate or 
personal \ relation that warrants constitutional protection. 
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to 
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
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tional). There is no upper limit on the membership of Rota-
ry clubs. About ten percent of the membership of a typical 
club moves away or drops out during a typical year. 2 Rota-
ry Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. The 
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects 
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge 
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to 
produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making 
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and en-
abling the club to be a true cross section of the business and 
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership un-
dertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the 
community, to raise the standards of the members' busi-
nesses and professions, and to improve international rela-
tions. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on di-
versity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members 
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind o ersonal 
relationship to which we have accorded protection under the 
First Amendment. To be sure, membership in Rotary clubs 
is not open to the general public. But each club is instructed 
to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective 
members located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary 
limits on the number of members in the club," and to "estab-
lish and· maintain a membership growth pattern." Rotary 
International, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981), App. 61-62. 
Many of the Rotary clubs' central activities are carried on in 
the presence of strangers. Rotary clubs are required to 
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates 
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary clubs, the 
• Rotary clubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals 
and transportation to the elderly, vocational guidance for high school stu-
dents, a swimming program for handicapped children, and international ex-
change programs, among many other service activities. Record 





BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB 9 
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App. 
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, 
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings 
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek 
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. 
In sum, Rotary clubs, rather than carrying on their activities 
in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows and 
doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69, 
App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the 
Unruh Act to local Rotary clubs does not interfere unduly 
with the members' freedom of private association. 5 
B 
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a cor-
responding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, 
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S., at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-:-933 (1982). For this reason, 
5 Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jay-
cees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Rob-
erts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested 
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations 
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Min-
nesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether 
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently inti-
mate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have 
no occasion in this case to consider ~r the First Amendment protects 
the right of individuals to associate in the "'many clubs and other entities 
with selective membership that are found throughout the country. 
Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment ex-
tends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objec-
tive characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No . 107 v. lrvis, 
407 U.S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Jj..l~ 
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"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's 
associates can violate the right of association protected by 
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case, 
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting 
women to Rotary clubs will affect in any significant way the 
existing members' ability to carry out their various~s. 
As a matter of policy, Rotary clubs do not take positions on 
"public questions," including political or international issues. 
Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), App. 
58-59. To be sure, Rotary clubs engage in a variety of com-
mendable service activities that are protected by the First 
Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the clubs 
to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not re-
quire them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian serv-
ice, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and 
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classifica-
tion system or admit members who do not reflect a cross-
section of the community. Indeed, by opening me s ip 
to leading business and professional women · e commu-
nity, Rotary clubs are likely to obtain a e representative 
cross-section of community leader 6 
~ X'o the extent,lffie Unruh Act may a~s infringing 
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that in-
fringement is necessary-to serve the State's compelling inter-
est in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of 
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to 
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of 
6 In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986). 
w. ~,""'. . ~-~ 
~-~~- ~~~~~~~~ 
- - ---·-- . :__-:-·-
•, -- --· 
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ideas). 7 On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota pub-
lic accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no 
distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. 
Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] com-
pelling state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at 
624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling 
interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the ac-
quisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as 
tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. The Unruh Act 
plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that applica-
tion of the Unruh Act to California Rotary clubs does not vio-
late the right of expressive assocation afforded by the First 
Amendment. 
III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these 
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. 
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented· in the state system." Webb v. 
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not 
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will 
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper pres-
entation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in 
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary."'" E xxon 
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181 n. 3 (1983) (quoting 
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting 
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants 
have made no such showing in this case. 8 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
8 Appellants contends that they presented the vagueness and over-
breadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court 
of Appeal: 
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the 
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited dis-
crimination to race , color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted 
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among cus-
tomers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organiza-
tions like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the 
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad 
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.' 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in 
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in 
Brief for Appellants 36-37). 
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the 
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for 
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately 
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness ·claims. A ca-
sual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is 
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim 
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 
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CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL. 
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SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[April -, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that requires 
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates 
the First Amendment. 
I 
A 
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. 
It is "an organization of business and professional men united 
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage 
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good-
will and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rota-
ry Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Ro-
tary Club is a member of International. Ibid. In August 
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International com-
prised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club 
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this 
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary 
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active 
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or 
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is 
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose 
an additional active member, who must be in the same busi-
ness or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus, 
each classification may be represented by two active mem-
bers. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" mem-
bers may represent the same classifications as active mem-
bers. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV, 
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of 
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 
(1981), App. 38-39. 
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is 
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new 
members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has promul-
gated recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates 
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications 
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifica-
tions committee determines whether the candidate's business 
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classi-
fication. The membership committee evaluates the candi-
date's "character, business and social standing, and general 
eligibility." Brieffor Appellant 7-8. If any member objects 
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the 
Club's board of directors. 
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
1 Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of 
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity . ... " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary 
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corpo-
rate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid. 
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an 
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male 
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows 
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied 
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, 
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Ro-
tary members may form their own associations, and are au-
thorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women be-
tween 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract, 
organizations sponsored by Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted 
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to 
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club 
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary 
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's 
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club 
and terminated its membership in Rotary International. 
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention 
was unsuccessful. 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).2 Appellees sought to enjoin In-
ternational from enforcing its restrictions against admitting 
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or 
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of 
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the 
2 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a 
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary Interna-
tional nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" 
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized 
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business ad-
vantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian ex-
penses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of 
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits 
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . . 
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid. 
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment 
for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are 
business establishments subject to the provisions of the 
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces 
"everything about which one can be employed," and an 
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but 
also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'per-
manent settled position (as in life or business).'" O'Connor 
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 
427, 430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 
Cal. 2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court 
of Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rota-
ry International, including its complex structure, large staff 
and budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court 
held that the trial court had erred in finding that the business 
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club 
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members 
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns 
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "busi-
ness benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians 
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-
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ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's 
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, serv-
ices, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court 
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine 
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear 
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences 
that teach managerial and professional techniques. 
The court also held that membership in Rotary Interna-
tional or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous, 
personal, and social relationship that take[s] place more or 
less outside public view." /d., at C-27 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded 
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously 
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Fi-
nally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy 
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment 
principles set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said 
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or at-
tempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside 
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court 
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member 
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them 
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender require-
ment against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition 
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction 
to the hearing on the merits. -- U. S. -- (1986). We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction,3 and affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
3 We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by 
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn 
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and 
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C.§ 1257(2). Appellants 
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and 
-
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II 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld 
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that 
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members. 
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants' 
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases 
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that 
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the 
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one 
form of protected association will also burden the other form 
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately 
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' free-
dom of private association and their freedom of expressive 
association. We follow the same course in this case. 
A 
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into 
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Such relationships may take various forms, including the 
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We 
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning 
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts 
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)). 
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to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional 
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have ac-
corded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and 
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and edu-
cation, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that 
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among 
family members. We have emphasized that the First 
Amendment protects th<;>se relationships, including family 
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and com-
mitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experi-
ences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of 
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 
619-620. But in Roberts we•observed that "[d]etermining 
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to 
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a 
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective 
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate 
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., 
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189 
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a 
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to 
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as 
size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded 
from critical aspects of the relationship. Id., at 620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship 
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or 
private relation that warrants constitutional protection. 
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to 
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
tional). There is no upper limit on the membership of any 
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local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of 
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year. 
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. 
The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of pros-
pects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to 
enlarge the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is 
to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making 
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and en-
abling the club to be a true cross section of the business and 
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership un-
dertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the 
community, to raise the standards of the members' busi-
nesses and professions, and to improve international rela-
tions. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on di-
versity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members 
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private 
or personal relationship to which we have accorded protec-
tion under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership 
in Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each 
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully quali-
fied prospective members located within its territory," to 
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the 
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth 
pattern." Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 139 
(1981), App. 61-62. 
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on 
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to 
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates 
'We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations, 
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the 
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the 
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program 
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among 
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J. 
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and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the 
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App. 
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, 
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings 
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek 
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. 
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activi-
ties in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows 
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 
69, App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the 
Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly 
with the members' freedom of private association. 5 
B 
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a cor-
responding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, 
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
5 Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jay-
cees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Rob-
erts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested 
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations 
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Min-
nesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether 
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently inti-
mate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have 
no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amend-
ment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and 
other entities with selective membership that are found throughout the 
country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amend-
ment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into 
the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason, 
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's 
associates can violate the right of association protected by 
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case, 
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting 
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the 
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes. 
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions 
on "public questions," including political or international is-
sues. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), 
App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of 
commendable service activities that are protected by the 
First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the 
clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not 
require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian 
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and 
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classifica-
tion system or admit members who do not reflect a cross-
section of the community. Indeed, by opening membership 
to leading business and professional women in the commu-
nity, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative 
cross-section of community leaders with a broadened capacity 
for service. 6 
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement 
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that in-
fringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling inter-
est in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of 
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to 
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of 
6 In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986). 
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ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota public 
accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no dis-
tinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. More-
over, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] compelling 
state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at 624. In 
Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling interest in 
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of 
leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible 
goods and services. ld., at 626. The Unruh Act plainly 
serves this interest. We therefore hold that application of 
the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not violate 
the right of expressive assocation afforded by the First 
Amendment. 7 
III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these 
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. 
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v. 
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not 
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will 
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper pres-
entation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in 
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary."'" Exxon 
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983) (quoting 
7 Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec-
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by 
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants' 
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the 
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities. 
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting 
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants 
have made no such showing in this case. 8 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
8 Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and over-
breadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court 
of Appeal: 
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the 
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited dis-
crimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted 
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among cus-
tomers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organiza-
tions like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the 
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad 
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.' 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in 
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in 
Brief for Appellants 36-37). 
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the 
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for 
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately 
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A ca-
sual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is 
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim 
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated:_ AP_R_ 2_3_ 19S_ 7 __ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-421 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNA-
TIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY 
CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[April -, 1987] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that requires 
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates 
the First Amendment. 
I 
A 
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. 
It is "an organization of business and professional men united 
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage 
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good-
will and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rota-
ry Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Ro-
tary Club is a member of International. Ibid. In August 
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International com-
prised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total 
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club 
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this 
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary 
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active 
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or 
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is 
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose 
an additional active member, who must be in the same busi-
ness or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus, 
each classification may be represented by two active mem-
bers. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" mem-
bers may represent the same classifications as active mem-
bers. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV, 
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of 
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 
(1981), App. 38-39. 
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is 
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new 
members. !d., at 7, App. 35. International has promul-
gated recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates 
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications 
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifica-
tions committee determines whether the candidate's business 
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classi-
fication. The membership committee evaluates the candi-
date's "character, business and social standing, and general 
eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects 
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the 
Club's board of directors. 
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97: Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
' Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of 
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary 
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corpo-
rate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid. 
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an 
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male 
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows 
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied 
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, 
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Ro-
tary members may form their own associations, and are au-
thorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women be-
tween 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract, 
organizations sponsored by Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted 
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to 
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club 
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary 
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's 
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club 
and terminated its membership in Rotary International. 
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention 
was unsuccessful. 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin In-
ternational from enforcing its restrictions against admitting 
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or 
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of 
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the 
2 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities , 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 
• 
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. Mter a 
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary Interna-
tional nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" 
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized 
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business ad-
vantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian ex-
penses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of 
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits 
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association ... 
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid. 
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment 
for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are 
business establishments subject to the provisions of the 
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces 
"everything about which one can be employed," and an 
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, ... but 
also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'per-
manent settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor 
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 
427, 430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co ., 57 
Cal. 2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court 
of Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rota-
ry International, including its complex structure, large staff 
and budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court 
held that the trial court had erred in finding that the business 
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club 
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members 
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns 
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "busi-
ness benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians 
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-
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ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's 
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, serv-
ices, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court 
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine 
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear 
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences 
that teach managerial and professional techniques. 
The court also held that membership in Rotary Interna-
tional or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous, 
personal, and social relationship that take[s] place more or 
less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded 
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously 
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Fi-
nally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy 
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment 
principles set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S. 609' (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said 
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or at-
tempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside 
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court 
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member 
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them 
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender require-
ment against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition 
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction 
to the hearing on the merits. -- U. S. -- (1986). We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
3 We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by 
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn 
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and 
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants 
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and 
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II 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld 
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that 
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members. 
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants' 
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases 
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that 
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the 
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one 
form of protected association will also burden the other form 
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately 
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' free-
dom of private association and their freedom of expressive 
association. We follow the same course in this case. 
A 
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into 
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Such relationships may take various forms, including the 
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We 
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning 
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts 
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U. S. 58, 61 , n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)). 
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to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional 
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have ac-
corded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and 
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and edu-
cation, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that 
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among 
family members. We have emphasized that the First 
Amendment protects those relationships, including family 
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and com-
mitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experi-
ences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of 
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 
619-620. But in Roberts we observed that "[d]etermining 
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to 
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a 
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective 
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate 
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., 
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189 
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a 
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to 
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as 
size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded 
from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at 620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship 
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or 
private relation that warrants constitutional protection. 
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to 
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
tional). There is no upper limit on the membership of any 
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local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of 
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year. 
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. 
The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of pros-
pects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to 
enlarge the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is 
to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making 
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and en-
abling the club to be a true cross section of the business and 
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership un-
dertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the 
community, "to raise the standards of the members' busi-
nesses and professions, and to improve international rela-
tions. 4 Such ·an inclusive "fellowship for service based on di-
versity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members 
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private 
or personal relationship to which we have accorded protec-
tion under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership 
in Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each 
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully quali-
fied prospective members located within its territory," to 
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the 
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth 
pattern." Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 139 
(1981), App. 61-62. 
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on 
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to 
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates 
'We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations, 
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the 
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the 
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program 
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among 
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J. 
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and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the 
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App. 
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, 
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings 
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek 
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. 
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activi-
ties in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows 
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 
69, App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the 
Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly 
with the members' freedom of private association. 5 
B 
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a cor-
responding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, 
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
6 Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jay-
cees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Rob-
erts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested 
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations 
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Min-
nesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether 
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently inti-
mate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have 
no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amend-
ment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and 
other entities with selective membership that are found throughout the 
country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amend-
ment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into 
the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason, 
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's 
associates can violate the right of association protected by 
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case, 
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting 
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the 
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes. 
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions 
on "public questions," including political or international is-
sues. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), 
App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of 
commendable service activities that are protected by the 
First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the 
clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not 
require them to abandon their basic. goals of humanitarian 
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and 
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classifica-
tion system or admit members who do not reflect a cross-
section of the community. Indeed, by opening membership 
to leading business and professional women in the commu-
nity, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative 
cross-section of community leaders with a broadened capacity 
for service. 6 
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement 
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that in-
fringement is justifiedJ>ecause i!._~~ the State's compel-
ling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. 
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) 
(right of association may be limited by state regulations 
necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the 
6 In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986). 
86-421-0PINION 
BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB 11 
suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the 
Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Rob-
erts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's 
viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly 
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468 
U. S., at 624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's 
compelling interest in assuring equal access to women ex-
tends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business con-
tacts as well as tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. 
The Unruh Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore 
hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary 
Clubs does not violate the right of expressive assocation 
afforded by the First Amendment. 7 
III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these 
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. 
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v. 
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not 
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will 
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper pres-
entation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in 
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.""' Exxon 
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983) (quoting 
7 Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec-
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by 
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants' 
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the 
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities. 
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting 
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants 
have made no such showing in this case. 8 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
• Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and over-
breadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court 
of Appeal: 
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the 
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited dis-
crimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted 
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among cus-
tomers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organiza-
tions like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the 
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad 
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.' 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in 
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in 
Brief for Appellants 36-37). 
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the 
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for 
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately 
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A ca-
sual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is 
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim 
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 
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Dear Lewis, 
I think you have written a fine opinion in this case and my 
join memo accompanies this note. I have only two points which I 
hope you will consider. First, I think we lack appellate 
jurisdiction. It is true, as you say, th.atrnevalidity of a 
st~s been sustained within the meaning of §1257(2) when 
the state court holds the statute applicable to a particular set 
of facts as against the contention that the application is 
invalid on federal grounds. But it is also true, as Stern and 
Gressman note, that "[i]n this context , it is necessary for 
appeal purposes that the litigant make specific and plain in the 
state court his contention that the application of the statute to 
his particular circumstances would make the statute void under 
federal law. If he chooses not to phrase his claim in that manner 
but argues instead that his f e deral rights prevent application of 
the state statute to him , an adverse decision amounts to a denial 
of his assertion of federal rights rather than a validation of 
the state statute, and review can be had in the Supreme Court 
only via certiorari. " See Richmond Newspapers , Inc. v. Virginia , 
448 u. s. 555 , 562-63 n. 4 (1979), and cases cited therein . 
The International has continuously argued that the 
application of the statute to it would violate its federal 
rights, not that the application of the statute to this set of 
facts would render the statute void. Although I agree with those 
who think these distinctions are semantic games, appellees made 
an argument based on this authority , and I feel uncomfortable not 
mentioning it. If no one obj~cts, could we say that it is a 
difficult question, - cit lng the cases appellee notes in its Brief, 
and simply grant certiorari? 
My second concern is with the associational rights of the 
International which, I think, is a small preliminary that should 
be touched upon before addressing the rights of the Local Clubs. 
Would you be willing to agd_ q_Jootnote at the beginning of your 
part II (or wherever you think best) making clear that the 
International itself has no associational right? For example : 
- n--rs~--t1re' Unruh Act mai 
constitutionally be applied to Rotary 
International. It is a massive aggregation 
of Local Clubs, and plainly cannot lay claim 
to any right of intimate association; 
moreover, the claim of expressive association 
is even weaker here than it was in Roberts. 
See infra, at -. We go on, however, to 
address the question whether the 
associational rights of members of the Local 
Rotary Clubs have been violated by the 
application of the Act at issue. 
Finally, would you consider dropping footnote 8? There 
would be circumstances in which I would consider appellants' 
presentation sufficient to raise an issue--for example, when such 
a showing was made on a question that would support a judgment 
below. 
Thank you so much for considering my concerns. 
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1. I originally took the view that we lack appellate 
jurisdiction in this case. But my sense is that a majority 
at Conference thought appellate jurisdiction is proper. 
Moreover, close inspection of the cases cited by Stern & 
Gressman does not support their distinction as strongly as I 
had thought. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
u.s. 555, 562-563 n.4 (1979), the question was whether the 
trial court properly exercised the d iscretlon conferred on 
it by the statute. Kulk.o v. CalifornLa Superior Court, 436 
u.s. 84, 90 n. 4 (1978), presented a challenge to the state 
court's decision to exercise in personam jurisdiction under 
a statute that conferred jurisdiction to the limits of the 
federal Constitution. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.s. 235, 
244 (1958), the appellants did not even mention the state 
statute until they filed a petition for rehearing with the 
Florida Supreme Court. 
The earlier cases cited by Stern & Gressman involve 
claims of systematic discrimina.tion against the litigant in 
the application of a tax statute. In each of these cases, 
the constitutionality of the statute itself was not at 
issue. Thus I am inclined to think the Court should view 
this as a proper appeal. Also, it may not be a good prac-
tice to qrant certiorari without deciding whether we have 
appellate jurisdiction. 
2. I think your second suggestion is an excellent one, 
and propose to add the following language in a new footnote 
at the end of the first paragraph of Part II: 
International, an association of thousands of 
local Rotary Clubs, can claim no constitu-
tionally protected right of private associa-
tion. Moreover, its expressive activities 
' are quite limited. See infra, at 10. Be-
cause the Court of Appeal held that the 
Duarte Rotary Club also is a business estab-
U.shment subject to the provisions of the 
Unruh Act, we proceed to consider whether 
application of the Unruh Act violates the 
rights of members of local Rotary Clubs. 
3. The purpose of note 8 is to address directly the con-
tention of appellants. I would have some concern about 
omitting it altogether. would it help if I revised the note 
as follows: 
Appellants point to a passage in the brief 
they filed in the California Court of Appeal 
that quotes th i.s Court's op .in ion in NAACP v. 
Button, 371 u.s. 415, 435 (1963): "'It is 
enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague 
and broad statute lenrls it self to selective 
enforcement against unpopular causes.'" 
Brief for Respondents in 8001663 (Cal. Court 
of Appe.'!l), p. 26 (brackets in original) 
(quoted in Brief for Appellants 36-37). The 
quotation occurs in the course of an argument 
that the Unruh Act should be applied only to 
memberships tn entities that are a vehicle 
for the public sale of goods, services, or 
commercial advantages. This casual reference 
to a f(~deral case, in the midst of an unre-
lated argument, is insufficient to inform a 
state court that it has been presented with a 
clatm subject to our appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 u.s.c. §1257(2). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-421 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNA-
TIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY 
CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[May 4, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We must decide whether a California statute that requires 
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates 
the First Amendment. 
I 
A 
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. 
It is "an organization of business and professional men united 
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage 
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good-
will and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 
(1981) (hereinafter Manual), App. 35. Individual members 
belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. 
In turn, each local Rotary Club is a member of International. 
Ibid. In August 1982, shortly before the trial in this case, 
International comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 coun-
tries, with a total membership of about 907,750. Brief for 
Appellant 7. 
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club 
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this 
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
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sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary 
Basic Library, Club Service 67-69, App. 86. Each active 
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or 
profession. The general rule is that "one active member is 
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose 
an additional active member, who must be in the same busi-
ness or professional classification." 1 I d., p. 7, App. 86. 
Thus, each classification may be represented by two active 
members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" 
members may represent the same classifications as active 
members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, 
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of 
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to 
membership. Manual 31, 33, App. 38-39. 
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is 
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new 
members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has promul-
gated Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates 
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications 
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifica-
tions committee determines whether the candidate's business 
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classi-
fication. The membership committee evaluates the candi-
date's "character, business and social standing, and general 
eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects 
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the 
club's board of directors. 
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
' Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of 
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic 
Library, Club Service 8 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary 
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corpo-
rate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid. 
t 
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an 
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male 
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows 
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied 
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, 
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of 
Rotary members may form their own associations, and are 
authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women 
between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or 
Rotaract, organizations sponsored by Rotary International. 
B 
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted 
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to 
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club 
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary 
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's 
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club 
and terminated its membership in Rotary International. 
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention 
was unsuccessful. 
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a 
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin 
International from enforcing its restrictions against admit-
ting women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or 
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of 
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the 
2 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a 
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary Interna-
tional nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" 
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized 
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business 
advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian ex-
penses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of 
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits 
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association ... 
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid. 
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their 
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of 
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment 
for International. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that 
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are 
business establishments subject to the provisions of the 
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "'business' embraces 
everything about which one can be employed," and an "estab-
lishment" includes "not only a fixed location, ... but also a 
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent 
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Vil-
lage Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427, 
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of 
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary 
International, including its complex structure, large staff and 
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held 
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business 
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club 
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members 
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns 
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "busi-
ness benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians 
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-
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ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's 
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, serv-
ices, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court 
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine 
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear 
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences 
that teach managerial and professional techniques. 
The court also held that membership in Rotary Interna-
tional or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous, 
personal, and social" relationship that "take[s] place more or 
less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded 
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously 
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Fi-
nally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy 
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment 
principles set out in Robe1-ts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said 
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or at-
tempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside 
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court 
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member 
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them 
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender require-
ment against the Duarte Club. 
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition 
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction 
to the hearing on the merits. 479 U. S. -- (1986). We 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
3 We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by 
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn 
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and 
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants 
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and 
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II 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld 
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that 
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members. 
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants' 
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases 
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that 
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the 
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one 
form of protected association will also burden the other form 
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately 
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' free-
dom of private association and their freedom of expressive 
association. We follow the same course in this case.~ 
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We 
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning 
of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of 
acts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal 
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); WaTren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax· Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)). 
'International, an association of thousands of local Rotary Clubs, can 
claim no constitutionally protected right of private association. Moreover. 
its expressive activities are quite limited. · See, i11jra, at 10. Because the 
Court of Appeal held that the Duarte Rotary Club also is a business estab-
lishment subject to the provisions of the Unruh Act, we proceed to con-
sider whether application of the Unruh Act violates the rights of members 
of local Rotary Clubs. 
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A 
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into 
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Such relationships may take various forms, including the 
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted 
to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional 
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have ac-
corded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and 
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and edu-
cation, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that 
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships 
among family members. We have emphasized that the First 
Amendment protects those relationships, including family 
relationships , that presuppose "deep attachments and com-
mitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of thoughts , experi-
ences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of 
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 
619-620. But in RobeTis we observed that "[d]etermining 
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to 
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a 
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective 
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate 
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., 
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189 
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a 
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to 
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as 
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size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded 
from critical aspects of the relationship. 468 U. S., at 620. 
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship 
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or 
private relation that warrants constitutional protection. 
The size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to 
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of 
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
tional). There is no upper limit on the membership of any 
local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of 
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year. 
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 9-11, App. 88. The 
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects 
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge 
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to pro-
duce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making possi-
ble the recognition of all useful local occupations, and en-
abling the club to be a true cross section of the business and 
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 60-61, App. 84. The membership under-
takes a variety of service projects designed to aid the commu-
nity, to raise the standards of the members' businesses and 
professions, and to improve international relations. 5 Such 
an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of in-
terest," ibid., however beneficial to the members and to 
those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private or per-
sonal relationship to which we have accorded protection 
under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership in 
Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each 
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully quali-
• We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations , 
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the 
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the 
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program 
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among 
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J. 
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fled prospective members located within its territory," to 
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the 
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth 
pattern." Manual 139, App. 61-62. 
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on 
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to 
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates 
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the 
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App. 
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, 
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings 
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek 
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. 
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activi-
ties in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows 
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library, 
Focus on Rotary 60-61, App. 85. We therefore conclude 
that application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does 
not interfere unduly with the members' freedom of private 
association. 6 
6 Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the 
Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S. 609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue 
Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had sug-
gested Kiwanis Clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accom-
modations Jaw. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments 
that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider 
whether the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was suffi-
ciently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, 
we have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First 
Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs 
and other entities with selective membership that are found throughout 
the country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First 
Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful in-
quiry into the objective characterjstics of the particular relationships at 
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B 
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a 
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, reli-
gious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason, 
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's 
associates can violate the right of association protected by 
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case, 
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting 
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the 
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes. 
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions 
on "public questions," including political or international 
issues. Manual115, App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs 
engage in a variety of commendable service activities that 
are protected by the First Amendment. But the Unruh Act 
does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these 
activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic 
goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all 
vocations, goodwill, and peace. Nor does it require them to 
abandon their classification system or admit members who do 
not reflect a cross-section of the community. Indeed, by 
opening membership to leading business and professional 
women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a 
more representative cross-section of community leaders with 
a broadened capacity for service. 7 
issue. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
' In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986). 
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Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement 
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that 
infringement is justified because it serves the State's com-
pelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. 
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) 
(right of association may be limited by state regulations 
necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the 
Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Rob-
erts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's 
viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly 
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468 
U. S., at 624. In Roberts we recognized that the State's 
compelling interest in assuring equal access to women ex-
tends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business con-
tacts as well as tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. 
The Unruh Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore 
hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary 
Clubs does not violate the right of · expressive association 
afforded by the First Amendment. ~ 
III 
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these 
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. 
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v. 
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not 
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed 
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The 
' Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec-
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by 
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of 
Appeal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants' 
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the 
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities. 
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court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the 
highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, 
it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of 
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved 
party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.""' 
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983) 
(quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) 
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). 
Appellants have made no such showing in this case. 9 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
JuSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part 
· in the decision or consideration of this case. 
9 Appellants point to a passage in the brief they filed in the California 
1 
Court of Appeal that quotes this Court's opinion in NAACP v. Bntton, 371 
' U. S. 415, 435 (1963): '"It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague 
and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular 
causes.'" Brief for Respondents in B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 
(brackets in original) (quoted in Brief of Appellants 37-37). The quotation 
occurs in the course of an argument that the Unruh Act should be applied 
only to memberships in entities that are a vehicle for the public sale of 
goods, services, or commercial advantages. This casual reference to a fed-
eral case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a 
state court that it has been presented with a claim subject to our appellate 
, jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C § 1257(2). 
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The Rotary Club of D~rte, California , admitted 
three women to active membership. Rotary 
International, / the parent organization of local Rotary 
clubs around the world, j notified the ou; rte club that 
admission of women members is contrary/ to the Rotary 
constitution. As a result, the international 
organization revoked the charter of the D~rte club. 
That Club,~and two of its women members, / brought 
this suit in the California Superior Court. They 
alleged that Rotary International - by revoking the 
D~rte charter -had violated California's Civil Rights 
Act. That Act provides, ( in part~ that men and women 
are entitled to equal treatment~in all California 
business entities. 
The trial court held that neither Rotary 
International/ nor the Du~rte Rotary . club/ is a business 
entity within the meaning of the Act. The California 
Court of Appeal reversed. It concluded that the Act 
appli~s to Rotary clubs, j and that Rotary's policy of 
excluding women is not protected by the First 
Amendment. 
For the reasons stated in an opinion filed toda~ 
we affirm. The relationship among Rotary club members~ 
is not the kind of private or intimate association~that 
warrants constitutional protection. Moreover, 
I 
tA....p~ 
membership in these clubs ~ basedAon one's position in 
a business or profession. Nor was there any evidence 
that admission of women~ould adversely affect the 
:S,IiP&eR:~ me~ expressive activities? ~f ~ 
1 
We concluded that our 1984 decision in Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees/ is a controlling precedent. 
JUSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment. 
JUSTICE BLACMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part 
in the decision or consideration of this case. 
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1211 CONP'EDERATE AVENUE 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23227, U.S. A. 
May 7 1987 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 
Dear Lewis: 
MAY 1 2 1907 
I would not be true to myself or Rotary, in which I have been 
a member for sixty years, if I did not tell you how disappointed I am 
at the Court ' s decision against Rotary International. In my judgment 
the Court was wrong. 
Over a periof of eighty two years Rotary has successfully main-
tained its growing membership with its constitution and by laws includ-
ing the word male only. Women as members of Rotary will be insignificant. 
They have a number of women 1s clubs and that is where they belong. 
Speaking for the Court I feel that your remarks are rather 
ambiguous. Discrimination, the most overworked word today cannot be 
applied to RotarY for Rotary does not inquire into color, creed, race, 
political or rellgious persuasion. Rotarians have their wives with tnem 
at district conferences, International Conventions and Valentine and 
Christmas parties. . 
I note that Justice Blackman who is an Honorary Rotarian and 
Justice 0 1Connor whose husband is an Honorary Rotarian did not take 
part in the ruling. One wonders if your Honorary Membership in the 
Rotary Club of Richmond is less recognized. 
It ' s a sad day in jurisprudence when a service club is told 
who its members may be. 
Sincerely 
May 14, 1987 
PERSONAL 
Dear Claude: 
Thank you for your thoughtful letter 
about the Court's decision in Board of Directors 
of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte. 
I enclose a copy of the Court unanimous 
opinion that may clarify for you what the Court 
decided. Although the decision itself relates 
only to the state of California, its reasoning 
will be viewed as applying generally. We simply 
followed Roberts v. United States Jaycees that was 
the controlling precedent. 
You will note that the Court spoke highly 
of the public service rendered by Rotary Clubs, 
and expressed the view that professional and busi-
ness women can make important contributions to 
these services. 
You mentioned that I had been made an 
honorary member of Richmond Rotary when I went on 
the Court 15 years ago. I appreciated the honor 
conferred on me, but as Ben Sheppard will recall, 
I advised him I could not take anv part in the 
activities of the Club. Indeed, I believe I at-
tended only one meeting some years ago when I was 
invited to speak. 
As you noted, two Justices disqualified 
themselves. One had been an active member for 
many years and, I believe, is a former club presi-
dent. The spouse of another Justice also is or 
has been an active member. It was believed neces-
sary for those of us who had never been active 
members to sit on the case to assure a quorum. 
2. 
I write this letter to you personally, 
with a copy to Ben, because of our long friendship 
and my concern that you not misunderstand. This 
letter is not for publication, nor should it be 
read to the membership of Rotary. Normally Jus-
tices make no explanation of their decisions. 
I will add this. I can understand your 
initial adverse reaction because I felt the same 
way when my college, Washington and Lee Universi-
ty, went coed. Yet, the result has been positive 
in every respect. Not only has the total number 
of qualified applications for admission increased 
substantially, but even trustees and faculty mem-
bers who opposed W&L going coed now believe that 
it has substantially improved the educational 
quality of the student body. 
I send best wishes to you and Ben. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Claude w. Woodward 
1211 Confederate Avenue 
Richmond, Virginia 23227 
lfp/ss 
cc: Dr. L. Benjamin Sheppard 
